University of Kentucky

UKnowledge
Theses and Dissertations--Psychology

Psychology

2015

ON A(PE)THEISM: RELIGIOUS DEHUMANIZATION OF ATHEISTS
AND OTHER OUTGROUPS
Ben Kok Leong Ng
University of Kentucky, benngkl86@gmail.com

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.

Recommended Citation
Ng, Ben Kok Leong, "ON A(PE)THEISM: RELIGIOUS DEHUMANIZATION OF ATHEISTS AND OTHER
OUTGROUPS" (2015). Theses and Dissertations--Psychology. 79.
https://uknowledge.uky.edu/psychology_etds/79

This Master's Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Psychology at UKnowledge. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations--Psychology by an authorized administrator of UKnowledge. For
more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

STUDENT AGREEMENT:
I represent that my thesis or dissertation and abstract are my original work. Proper attribution
has been given to all outside sources. I understand that I am solely responsible for obtaining
any needed copyright permissions. I have obtained needed written permission statement(s)
from the owner(s) of each third-party copyrighted matter to be included in my work, allowing
electronic distribution (if such use is not permitted by the fair use doctrine) which will be
submitted to UKnowledge as Additional File.
I hereby grant to The University of Kentucky and its agents the irrevocable, non-exclusive, and
royalty-free license to archive and make accessible my work in whole or in part in all forms of
media, now or hereafter known. I agree that the document mentioned above may be made
available immediately for worldwide access unless an embargo applies.
I retain all other ownership rights to the copyright of my work. I also retain the right to use in
future works (such as articles or books) all or part of my work. I understand that I am free to
register the copyright to my work.
REVIEW, APPROVAL AND ACCEPTANCE
The document mentioned above has been reviewed and accepted by the student’s advisor, on
behalf of the advisory committee, and by the Director of Graduate Studies (DGS), on behalf of
the program; we verify that this is the final, approved version of the student’s thesis including all
changes required by the advisory committee. The undersigned agree to abide by the statements
above.
Ben Kok Leong Ng, Student
Dr. Will Gervais, Major Professor
Dr. Mark Fillmore, Director of Graduate Studies

ON A(PE)THEISM: RELIGIOUS DEHUMANIZATION
OF ATHEISTS AND OTHER OUTGROUPS

____________________________________
Thesis
____________________________________
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Master of Science in the
College of Arts and Sciences at
the University of Kentucky

By
Ben Kok. Leong. Ng
Lexington, Kentucky
Director: Dr. Will Gervais, Professor of Psychology
Lexington, Kentucky
2015
Copyright © Ben Kok. Leong. Ng 2015

ABSTRACT OF THESIS

ON A(PE)THEISM: RELIGIOUS DEHUMANIZATION
OF ATHEISTS AND OTHER OUTGROUPS

Research on the dark side of religion has recently found evidence that anti-atheist
prejudice is embedded in distrust (Gervais et al, 2011). Anti-atheist prejudice though old
in its form, has only been systemically researched on over the last couple of years. This
study seeks to extend on research in anti-atheist prejudice by examining religious
dehumanization of atheists in comparison with other religious outgroups – gays and
Muslims. Study 1 utilized a two factor model of dehumanization (Haslam, 2006) to
examine dehumanization. Study 2 serves as a conceptual replication and extension using
two different measures of dehumanization. Study 1 failed to find support for religious
dehumanization while study 2 found partial support.
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On A(Pe)Theism: Religious Dehumanization
Of Atheists And Other Outgroups

Chapter 1: Introduction
While the study of prejudice has historically been situated in the context of race and
gender, empirical research on religious prejudice has gotten more attention in recent years.
Specifically, recent research has examined religious prejudice directed toward outgroups such as
African-American (Hall, Matz & Wood, 2010, Rowatt & Franklin, 2004), Muslims (Rowatt,
Franklin & Cotton, 2005, Leak & Finken, 2011), homosexuals (Johnson, Rowatt & Labouff,
2012, Johnson, Rowatt, Barnard-Brak, Patock-Peckham, Labouff & Carlisle, 2011) and atheists
(Gervais, Shariff & Norenzayan, 2011, Johnson et al, 2012). Central to this study is religious
prejudice against atheists.
Anti-atheist prejudice is grounded in evidence showing that atheists are often being
distrusted by religious people (Gervais et al, 2011). The underlying logic behind distrust as
central to anti-prejudice is derived from an amalgamation of both evolutionary accounts of
religion (Atran & Norenzayan, 2004; Norenzayan et al, 2014) and prejudice (Cottrell & Neuberg,
2005; Kurzban & Leary, 2001). However, because research on anti-atheist prejudice is still at its
infancy, little else is known. Given that outgroup prejudice is often broadly associated with
dehumanization, studying religious dehumanization, particularly one against atheist, can help
shed light on the psychological consequences of religious conflict. This study is therefore an
attempt at investigating the dehumanization of atheists especially as related to other religious
outgroups. Because atheist seems to be a group that is perceived as highly immoral, comparable
even to rapists (Gervais, 2013), it stands to reason that perhaps atheists will be dehumanized to a
larger extent than other religious outgroups such as gays and Muslims.
1

Theories of Dehumanization
Although dehumanization has been shown to be a robust predictor of prejudice, it has
rarely been studied outside of topics pertaining to ethnicity, race and genocide (Haslam, 2006).
Occasional attempts have been made to incorporate dehumanization into domains such as
disability (O’Brien, 1999), technology (Beckers & Schmidt, 2001) and medicine (Fink, 1982) in
the past, but it has yet to be examined with respect to religion. Because dehumanization accounts
in psychology can take on several forms, I will begin by giving a brief overview of the different
accounts, starting from the early 1990s to the present.
Early research by Opotow (1990) positioned dehumanization as a “moral exclusion”
model whereby outgroups are situated “outside the boundary in which moral values, rules and
considerations of fairness apply” (p.1). While there can be milder forms of exclusion,
dehumanization is taken to be an extreme form. Morally excluded groups are usually portrayed
as enemies of the included because they are perceived to be a threat to the moral community and
morally inferior to the ingroup. Bandura (1999) emphasized how dehumanization facilitates the
disengagement of the aggressor’s moral self-sanctions, enabling aggressive behaviors against the
dehumanized. Struch & Schwartz (1989) proposed a values approach whereby outgroups who
are identified as possessing a different set of values are seen as inhumane. Dissimilarity in values
provides a justification for dehumanizing outgroup members without having to feel any sense of
guilt. Together, these early accounts hint at a moral dimension to dehumanization by contending
that dehumanized victims are seen as less morally worthy beings.
More recently, a dual factor model of dehumanization has been proposed to integrate
older accounts (Haslam, 2006, Haslam & Loughnan, 2014). According to Haslam (2006), there
are two distinct psychological pathways people can deny others of humanness. The first
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approach is denying others Uniquely Human (UH) characteristics. The defining feature of UH is
the human-animal divide. UH characteristics include attributes as such civility, moral sensibility
and refinement (Leyens, Rodriguez, Rodriguez, Gaunt, Paladino & Vaes, 2001). People denied
of UH characteristics are perceived as childlike, lacking in self-control, uncultured and
ultimately indistinguishable from animals. The savage nature of animals is often considered an
indicator that animals do not possess a moral compass to differentiate between right and wrong.
Consequently, denying people of UH characteristics is akin to seeing victims as animals who are
unable to regulate their moral behaviors. This approach is very much similar to early accounts of
dehumanization mentioned previously. The second method of defining humanness is attributing
Human Nature (HN) characteristics to others. These are features that are core to humans. The
human-inanimate object divide is the defining feature of the second dimension (Haslam &
Loughnan, 2014). People who are denied HN characteristics are seen as lacking in emotionality,
warmth, and agency. The theme running through HN characteristics is that denial can lead to the
dehumanized target being portrayed as mechanistic (Haslam, 2006).
Another account of dehumanization that emerged from research in mind perception deals
with the attribution of mind to a variety of entities (Wayz, Gray, Epley & Wegner, 2010).
According to Gray, Gray & Wegner (2007), mind perception consists of two dimensions; agency
and experience. The agency dimension measures mental capabilities such as thinking while the
experience dimension comprises of emotions and personality. The denial of mind to others is
central to the mind perception framework of dehumanization (Kozak, Marsh & Wegner, 2006).
Last but not least, the stereotype content model (SCM) (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, Xu, 2002)
utilizes two dimensions – warmth and competence - to understand the contents of our
stereotypes. SCM posits that different combinations of the two dimensions will produce distinct
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emotions associated with different stereotypes. By juxtaposing dehumanization onto SCM,
Harris & Fiske (2006) found that only those in the low warmth and low competence quadrant,
extreme outgroups who are the “lowest of the low” are dehumanized. Groups associated with
this quadrant are the homeless and drug addicts.
Dehumanization of atheists
Accounts proposed by Opotow (1990), Bandura (1999) and the UH aspect of Haslam’s
model (2006) converge on the idea that there is a moral element to dehumanization. This is in
line with recent empirical evidence on perception of atheists as immoral. Using the conjunction
fallacy, atheists were found to be intuitively associated with a variety of immoral acts, such as
murder, cannibalism and necrobestiality (Gervais, 2014). In a series of studies, comparison
between atheists and other cultural groups consistently showed that immoral behaviors were
judged to be more representative of atheists. Additionally, a recent sociological study examining
membership acceptance in America found atheists to be the least likely accepted group (Edgell,
Gerteis & Hartmann, 2006). Participants similarly judged atheists as the group least likely to
have a compatible vision of America as them. The authors in their conclusion argued that
cultural exclusion is likely due to the construction of atheists “as the symbolic representation of
one who rejects the basis for moral solidarity…in American society”. Although atheists do not
constitute a cohesive or powerful group, they are consistently being singled out as a group whose
values are in sharp contrast with America’s value of what is good and just.
Accordingly, if people who are dehumanized are also morally excluded from the
community, perceived as having divergent values and seen as morally insensible and
misinformed, atheists seem to fit into this category based on their inextricable link with
immorality. Brandt & Reyna (2011) provided a potential framework for explaining how
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dehumanization can come from perceptions of immorality by proposing a vertical hierarchy of
morality that is embodied in people. Beings (humans or not) who are the quintessence of good
(god in this case for religious people) are situated at the top of the chain while the bottom
personifies evil and immorality. Their social cognitive chain of being (SCCB) framework goes
further by describing how targets who move up the chain will be sanctified but targets who fall
below will be dehumanized. Integrating this framework with previous work on atheist
immorality (Gervais, 2014, Gervais et al, 2011), atheists should be positioned extremely low in
the chain – comparable to rapists and serial murderers. Their lowly position on the chain should
thus facilitate dehumanization.
However, the logic of SCM predicts that atheists will not be dehumanized as they do not
fit into the low-low quadrant. Based on Fiske and colleagues’ (2002) study, groups in the low
warmth and low competent cluster have a mean warmth score of 2.66 and a mean competence
score of 2.29 for the student sample (Study 2). In comparison, Gervais and colleagues’ (2011)
pilot study (Study 4) following the exact methodology saw atheist scoring 3.16 and 3.42 in the
warmth and competence dimensions respectively. Ratings of atheists were similar to groups such
as feminists and Jews who were categorized as high in competence and low in warmth in Fiske
et al’s (2002) study. Extending from the SCM framework of dehumanization, atheists should not
be dehumanize. Although the SCM account of dehumanization would not predict atheists to be
dehumanized, some clarification and evidence from research in person perception may help
reconcile this inconsistency.
Firstly, our study is specific to the religious context while the SCM account is context
neutral. In our study, the perceivers –the participants– are the religious ingroup while the
perceived –the target– is the atheist outgroup. The competence dimension may become less
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relevant while the warmth dimension takes precedence because religion has more to do with
morality than competence. Because morality plays a role in the warmth dimension (Leach,
Ellemers & Barreto, 2007; Wojciszke, Bazinska, & Jaworski, 1998), dehumanization may still
occur regardless of atheists’ competence level. Furthermore, evidence from recent research in
person perception by Goodwin, Piazza & Rozin (2014) found that although warmth and moral
character are usually seen as substitutes in the literature, they are in fact distinguishable (Study 1
& 2). Their primary proposition however was that moral character dominates in person
perception when compared to the warmth dimension. Indeed this was tested and found across 5
studies. The importance of moral character information together with the atheist immorality link
support the dehumanization account of atheists.
Chapter 2: Overview
To this end, two studies were conducted to examine the dehumanization of atheists with
two other relevant religious outgroups – gays and Muslims. In study 1, I hypothesized that 1)
dehumanization of atheists is characterized more by the denial of Uniquely Human (UH)
characteristics than Human Nature (HN) characteristics, and 2) that this occurs more strongly for
atheists than for other outgroups. Study 2 is both a conceptual replication and extension of study
1. Two measures of dehumanization are used. The first bears similarity with UH characteristics
based on their association with morality. The second measure, conceptualizing dehumanization
as denying others of a mind, permits a test of dehumanization in a different form by extending
dehumanization of atheists via the denial of minds to them.
Chapter 3: Study 1
Study 1 was conducted to test two hypotheses. 1) Because atheists are often perceived as
immoral (Gervais, 2014), they will be dehumanized via denial of Uniquely Human (UH) as
6

opposed to Human Nature (HN) characteristics. The UH route includes moral features that are
lacking in HN traits which, I argue, plays a crucial role in dehumanizing atheists. 2) As atheists
are associated with immorality much more than other religious outgroups, they should also be
denied of UH characteristics more than other outgroups. In Study 1, gays and Muslims were
included as the comparison outgroups. I am agnostic about the how the three groups might differ
in the HN dimension.
Participants.
Participants were 100 undergraduates (73 females) who participated in the study for
course credit. Age ranged from 17 to 28 years (M = 19.12, SD = 1.79). For our sample, 43.5%
were Christians, 29.7% were Catholics, 3% were Hindus, 1% were Buddhists, 15.9% were
atheists, agnostic or nones and the remaining 5.9% were of other religions.
Materials.
Dehumanization scale: To measure dehumanization, the scale from a previous study used by
Bastian & Haslam (2010) was adopted. A list of 20 trait ratings were used to measure
dehumanization. The 20 traits include 5 positive and 5 negative traits for each of the Uniquely
Human and Human Nature dimension. A list of all 20 traits is shown in Appendix 1. These traits
have previously been validated for being highly associated with their respective humanness
dimension while being distinct from each other (Haslam, Bain, Douge, Lee & Bastian, 2005).
Procedure
Participants were first asked to rate atheists, gays and Muslims on both the UH and HN
traits. For each outgroup, participants had to rate how much they think someone from that group
possesses each trait shown on a 7 point Likert scale from 1- completely do not possess this trait
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at all to 7- completely possess this trait. Participants rated each outgroup separately with each
outgroup representing a block. In each block, the same 20 traits were presented to the
participants. Presentation of all 20 traits were randomized within each block. Participants then
completed demographic items before being debriefed.
Chapter 4: Results
Two sets of analyses are reported. The first set follows the original methods ascribed by
Haslam and colleagues (2005) and the second set is a modification based on valence of traits. For
both sets of analyses, higher scores indicate lesser dehumanization.
Method One
Scores for each dimension were first computed by averaging across all positive and
negative traits. Averaging across both positive and negative traits accounts for valence when
assessing perception of humanness (Haslam, personal communication).
UH vs HN for atheists: A paired sample t-test indicated no significant difference in
dehumanization scores for atheists in the UH (M=3.99, SD=.67) and HN (M=3.95, SD=.81)
dimensions, t (100) = .75, p =.455 (Figure 1). The hypothesis that atheists are being
dehumanized via UH characteristics more so than HN characteristics was not supported.
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Figure 1: Dehumanization across UH and HN dimensions for atheists (Method 1)
UH traits across groups: A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to compare the effects of
different outgroups on the UH dimension of the dehumanization scale. Mauchly’s test indicated
that the assumption of sphericity had been violated for the UH dimension X2 (2) = 13.41, p =
.001. Therefore, degrees of freedom was corrected using Huynh-Feldt estimates of sphericity (ɛ
= .902). Contrary to my hypothesis, results showed that there was no significant effect of
outgroup on UH scores, F (1.8, 178.5) = .078, p = .908. Results indicated that all three outgroups
did not vary in their UH scores – all outgroups were equally dehumanized in an animalistic
manner. The hypothesis that atheists are denied UH characteristics more than gays and Muslims
was rejected in favor of the null.
HN traits across groups: As an exploratory analysis, a repeated measures ANOVA was
conducted to compare the effects of different outgroups on the HN dimension of the
dehumanization scale. Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been
violated for the HN dimension, X2 (2) = 8.05, p = .018. Therefore, degrees of freedom was
corrected using Huynh-Feldt estimates of sphericity (ɛ= .944). For HN scores, there was a
significant difference across outgroups, F (1.9, 186.9) = 16.34, p = .00. Pairwise comparison
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indicated that there was a significant difference in HN scores for the atheist (M=3.94, SD=.81)
and gay (M=3.50, SD=.66) conditions, t (100) = 4.83, p = .00. Additionally, there was a
significant difference in HN scores between Muslims (M=3.87, SD=.68) and gays (M=3.50,
SD=.66), t (99) = 4.86, p = .000. Gays had a lower HN score, suggesting that they were also
mechanistically dehumanization more than Muslims. There was no significant difference
between Muslims and atheists, t (99) = -.93, p = .35. Although not explicated hypothesized, gays
were found to be mechanistically dehumanized more than atheists and Muslims.
Method two
For method two, both the positive and negative traits were analyzed separately. Because a
case can be made that the way valence is accounted for based on the original method does not fit
with current theories of intergroup conflict (more on this in the general discussion section),
valence is separated instead of being combined into a single score for each dimension.
UH vs HN for atheists: Two paired sample t-tests were conducted, one comparing positive UH
vs HN traits and another for the negative traits. For positive valence, there was a marginally
significant difference between UH (M=4.10, SD=1.16) and HN (M=4.22, SD=1.11) traits, t
(103) = -1.84, p =.069 (Figure 2). Atheists were attributed more positive HN than UH traits,
suggesting a greater degree of dehumanization via the UH route, at least for positive traits,
although the extent of dehumanization was not significantly different from each other.
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Figure 2: Dehumanization across UH and HN dimensions for atheists (Positive Valence)
For negative valence, there was no significant difference in dehumanization scores for
both UH (M=3.88, SD=.99) and HN traits (M=3.86, SD=.92), t (103) = .220, p =.826 (Figure 3).
Atheists were evaluated as possessing both negative UH and HN traits to an equal extent.

Figure 3: Dehumanization across UH and HN dimensions for atheists (Negative Valence)
UH traits across groups: Two repeated measures ANOVA were conducted to compare the
effects of different outgroups on the positive and negative UH dimension of the dehumanization
scale. Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity was not violated, X2 (2) = 3.65,
p = .161. For positive UH scores, there was a significant difference across groups, F (2, 204) =
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11.33, p = .000 (Figure 4). All pairwise comparisons were significant. Comparison between the
atheist (M=4.10, SD=1.16) and gay (M=4.65, SD=.85) conditions, t (103) = -4.44, p = .00
suggests that atheists were rated as possessing less positive UH traits. Results were similar when
atheists (M=4.10, SD=1.16) were compared to Muslims (M=4.39, SD=1.06), t (102) = -2.55, p =
.012. Muslims also scored significantly lower (M=4.39, SD=1.06) compared to gays (M=4.65,
SD=.85), t (102) = 2.44, p = .016. Overall, atheists had the lowest score for positive UH traits,
followed by Muslims and then gays.

Figure 4: Dehumanization of UH traits across groups (Positive Valence)
For negative valence traits, sphericity was not violated X2 (2) = 2.85, p = .241 and there
was a significant difference across groups, F (2, 204) = 7.83, p = .001 (Figure 5). Of the three
pairwise comparisons conducted, two were significant. Atheists (M=3.88, SD=.99) scored higher
on negative UH traits than gays (M=3.40, SD=1.08), t (103) = 3.98, p = .000 and Muslims
(M=3.62, SD=1.19), t (102) = 2.33, p = .022. There was no significant difference between gays
and Muslims, t (102) = -1.70, p = .092. Overall, atheists were dehumanized the least for negative
UH traits.
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Figure 5: Dehumanization of UH traits across groups (Negative Valence)
HN traits across groups: Similar to the previous analyses, two repeated measures ANOVA were
conducted on both the positive and negative HN dimension of the dehumanization scale. For
positive valence, sphericity was not violated X2 (2) = 2.76, p = .251 and there was a significant
overall difference across groups, F (2, 204) = 25.41, p = .000. Of the three pairwise comparisons
conducted, two were significant. Both atheists (M=4.22, SD=1.11) and Muslims (M=4.35,
SD=1.02) had a significantly lower positive HN score than gays (M=5.00, SD=.84): atheist vs
gays, t (103) = -6.24, p = .000, Muslims vs gays, t (102) = 5.97, p = .000. There was no
significant difference between atheists and Muslims. Gays were dehumanized the least compared
to atheists and Muslims.
For negative valence traits, sphericity was not violated, X2 (2) = 3.28, p = .194. However,
ANOVA results suggest that there was no significant differences across all three groups for
negative HN traits, F (2, 204) = 390, p = .678.
Chapter 5: Discussion
Results for study 1 using the original method did not comport with any of our
hypotheses. Atheists were neither seen as more animalistic than mechanical nor were they denied
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of UH traits any more than gays and Muslims. Based on preliminary exploratory analyses, there
was a significant difference in HN scores across groups, with gays being mechanistically
dehumanized more than atheists and Muslims. Method two however gives us a different set of
answers. Although atheists were not denied of UH traits any more than HN traits, they were
denied of positive UH traits more than the comparison outgroups. However, atheists were
dehumanized the least when it comes to negative UH traits. For the exploratory analyses of HN
traits, gays were found to be dehumanized the least for positive traits. Two different
interpretations are possible. One could either conclude that atheists are perceived as less human
only on positive traits and more human on negative or interpret current findings as atheists
generally being seen in a less positive light for both positive and negative UH traits. The latter
interpretation though different from Haslam’s (2006) definition of dehumanization, is consistent
with other accounts and corroborates with evidence from the prejudice literature.
Chapter 6: Study 2
Because study 1 did not comport with our hypotheses, study 2 was conducted as a
conceptual replication and extension of study 1 with two different measures of dehumanization.
The first is a 4-item measure that is a subscale of the 32-item moral disengagement scale
(Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara & Pastorelli, 1996). The second is a 10-item mind attribution
scale with three subscales measuring Emotion, Intention and Cognition (Kozak, Marsh &
Wegner, 2006). The tendency to attribute a mind to others may be driven by the desire to
humanize those we come to see as ingroup members (Cortes, Demoulin & Rodriguez, 2005), a
trait that is unique to humans. Therefore, attributing less mind to others can be inferred as a form
of dehumanization. Moreover, research in mind perception found evidence that animals are rated
as lacking in agency (Gray et al, 2006), a dimension comparable in contents with the Human
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Uniqueness account (Haslam, 2006), hypothesized as central to the dehumanization of atheists.
Because the mind attribution account of dehumanization is equally plausible, including the mind
attribution scale makes it possible to ground and test the dehumanization of atheists within the
morally relevant dimension in study 1 but in a different form.
Participants.
Participants were 113 undergraduates (96 females) who participated in the study for
course credit. Their age ranged from 18 to 35 years (M = 19.66, SD = 2.53). For our sample,
49.6% were Christians, 31% were Catholics, 2.7% were Muslims, .9% were Buddhists, .9% were
Hindus, 9.1% were atheists or agnostic and the remaining .9% were of other religions.
Materials.
Dehumanization scale (Bandura et al, 1996): This scale consists of 4 items as shown in
Appendix II. Items in the scale include “Some people deserve to be treated like animals” and
“Some people have to be treated roughly because they lack feelings that can be hurt”.
Modifications were made so that each statement represents the target outgroup.
Mind Attribution Scale (Kozak et al, 2006): There are 10 items in this scale consisting of 3
subscales (Appendix III). The Emotion subscale has 4 items, with questions such as “This person
can experience pain”. The Intention subscale has 3 items. An example question is as follows:
“This person is capable of planned actions.” Cognition is the last subscale, consisting of 3 items
with questions such as “This person is highly conscious.”
Procedure
Using a within-subjects design similar to study 1, participants had to rate members of all
three outgroups on both the dehumanization and mind attribution scale using a 7 point Likert
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scale. As in study 1, participants rated each outgroup separately with each outgroup representing
a block. In each block, both measures were randomly presented to the participants.
Chapter 7: Results
Dehumanization scale: The 4-item dehumanization scale (Bandura et al, 1996) formed a
reliable scale for all target outgroups, with Cronbach’s αs ranging from .81 to .85. A repeated
measures ANOVA was conducted to compare the effects of different outgroups on ratings for the
dehumanization scale. Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had not been
violated X2 (2) = 4.69, p = .096. Results showed that there was a significant difference between
outgroups in dehumanization scores, F (2, 224) = 4.32, p = .014 (Figure 6).

Figure 6: Dehumanization across groups (Bandura et al, 1996)
Three paired samples t-tests were conducted for comparison between conditions. The first
paired samples t-test indicated a significant difference in dehumanization scores between atheists
(M=1.74, SD=1.03) and gays (M=1.60, SD=.93), t (112) = 2.50, p =.014. Atheists were
dehumanized significantly more so than gays. A second paired sample t-test between Muslims
(M=1.77, SD=1.10) and gays (M=1.60, SD=.93) was also significant, t (112) = 2.75, p =.007.
Muslims were being dehumanized more than gays. The last paired sample t-test however did not
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indicate any significant difference in dehumanization scores between atheists and Muslims, t
(112) = .44, p =.658.
Mind Attribution Scale: As the mind attribution scale consists of three subscales, three
exploratory factor analyses were conducted, one for each target outgroup, to test for three factors
as reported in the original study. If three factors are extracted, subsequent ANOVAs will be
conducted based on the three factors extracted. If factor analyses do not indicate that the items
load onto three unique factors as suggested by Kozak and colleagues (2006), a composite score
will be computed for further analyses.
A principal components extraction with varimax rotation was performed for each target
outgroup. None of the factor analyses revealed three unique factors with eigenvalues more than
1. For atheists and Muslims, only one factor was extracted that had an eigenvalue greater than 1
while 2 factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 were extracted for the gay target. Because factor
analyses were not consistent with the previous conceptual framework of mind attribution (Kozak
et al, 2006), all items were averaged to generate a single mind attribution score to be used for
repeated measures ANOVA. For all target outgroups, the mind attribution scale had adequate
reliability, with Cronbach’s αs ranging from .89 to .93.
A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to compare the effects of different
outgroups on mind attribution. Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had not
been violated X2 (2) = 4.97, p = .083. Results showed that there is a significant difference
between outgroups in mind attribution scores, F (2, 224) = 8.24, p = .000 (Figure 7).
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Figure 7: Mind Attribution across groups (Kozak et al, 2006)
Three paired sample t-tests were conducted for comparison between conditions. The first
paired sample t-test indicated a significant difference in mind attribution scores between atheists
(M=6.07, SD=.93) and gays (M=6.23, SD=.76), t (112) = -3.52, p =.001. Because a higher score
in this case is interpreted as less dehumanization, atheists with a lower mean score are being
dehumanized more than gays. A second paired sample t-test between Muslims (M=6.10,
SD=.84) and gays (M=6.23, SD=.76) was also significant, t (112) = 3.44, p =.001. Muslims were
attributed less mind than gays. The last paired sample t-test between atheists and Muslims did
not find any significant difference, t (112) = -.71, p =.477.
Chapter 8: Discussion
A conceptual replication of religious dehumanization in study 2 partially confirms the
hypothesis. Across two measures of dehumanization, results consistently imply that atheists were
being dehumanized to a significantly greater extent than gays. However, neither the
dehumanization scale nor the mind attribution scale indicated any mean difference between
atheists and Muslims.
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Chapter 9: General discussion
At the outset, I explicitly stated my hypotheses that 1) atheists will be denied of UH traits
more than for HN traits and 2) the level of dehumanization toward atheists will be greater than
gays and Muslims. Results of study 1 however, were contrary to the hypotheses. Atheists were
dehumanized equally via the UH and HN dimensions. Furthermore, atheist targets did not differ
from gay or Muslim targets on the UH dimension ratings. Although not central to the study,
exploratory analyses in study 1 found that gays were being mechanistically dehumanized more
than atheists and Muslims. A conceptual replication in study 2 however partially supported
hypothesis two. Across two dehumanization scales, atheists were found to be dehumanized more
than gays, but did not fare any worse than Muslims. In the following sections, possible causes of
failure to find significant results are discussed.
Methodological Issue
With the different ways that dehumanization can be defined and measured, is the two
factor framework, based on ratings of positive and negative traits, methodologically sound?
While I agree that a dual factor model can be beneficial in its nuance, the logic of the scale may
not be as intuitive and easily interpretable. According to Haslam (personal communication), “if
you accept theoretically that hating someone and dehumanizing them aren't the same thing (i.e.,
that dehumanization isn't just negative evaluation) then you have to accept that people can be
disliked but not dehumanized and that they can be liked (or at least not hated) and still be in
some sense seen as lacking humanness.” Therefore, both positive and negative traits were
included to account for valence effect. The corollary based on his argument is this: an outgroup
member with supposedly a high score for negative traits and a low score for positive traits might,
with some combination of ratings, be seen as more human than an ingroup member with the
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opposite ratings. If dehumanization is indeed intimately associated with prejudice, then this
suggests the possibility that one can dehumanized and consequently be prejudice against one’s
ingroup more than an outgroup. It is hard, at least theoretically, to imagine how this outcome
might fit into current theories of intergroup conflict and prejudice. Additionally, separate
analyses excluding valence effects (method two of study 1) provided at least preliminary support
for this argument when atheists were attributed less positive but more negative traits. This is
consistent with the robust findings of prejudice against outgroups.
Lack of power?
Another possibility is the lack of power in study 1 to detect an effect. A post hoc analysis
using Gpower revealed that the study had 50% power to detect a small effect size of Cohen’s f =
.1 (translates to a d of .2). A general rule of thumb in psychology is to have a sample size with at
least power of 80% which the study did not meet.
Muslims vs atheists
Current events could also have contributed to an elevation in dehumanization of Muslims
– which could partly explain why atheists and Muslims did not differ in dehumanization ratings
in study 2. For the past year, news reports of killings by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
(ISIS), an Islamic extremist rebel group have been spreading like wildfire. Participants with
access to media platforms could have easily encountered many of these reports, exacerbating
anti-Muslim prejudice, and possibly fueling the desire to dehumanized Muslims in order to
condemn and react aggressively against them without feeling guilt or remorse. What is worth
noting is that even when anti-Muslim prejudice is on the rise at the moment, atheists did not fare
better and were dehumanized just as much.
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Chapter 10: Future Directions
Belief vs Affiliation
Religion is not monolithic. Rather, it is derived from the coalescing of a constellation of
features (Hill, 2005). Many psychologists and sociologists have sought to uncover these
fundamental features that can serve as a starting point for religion research (Saroglou, 2011;
Voas, 2007, Hill & Williamson, 2005). Although each framework differs in some ways, there is
a general consensus that religion has a component related to belief and another with group
affiliation (Preston, Ritter & Hernandez, 2010). The belief component is thought to underlie the
unmaking of religious prejudice while affiliation intensifies prejudice by exaggerating group
differences. Measures associated with belief are intrinsic and quest orientations, which have been
found to predict less prejudice (Allport & Ross, 1967; Batson & Schoenrade, 1991; Donahue,
1985). Conversely, measures such as fundamentalism and right wing authoritarianism,
commonly associated with higher prejudice (Altermeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; Laythe, Finkel,
Bringle & Kirkpatrick, 2002) tend to be proxies for affiliation rather than belief.
Therefore, perhaps it is not religion per se but specifically identification with one’s
religious group that promotes dehumanization. Future studies could either measure these
constructs or prime participants with concepts associated with each component (Preston & Ritter,
2013), providing a more nuance picture of religious dehumanization.
Religious aggression
Bandura’s model of moral disengagement (1999) proposed that dehumanization
facilitates aggression because it relieves one of the guilt from engaging in a negative behavior. In
support of his theory Bandura, Underwood & Fromson (1975) found that victim dehumanization
led to higher aggression via an increase in shock intensity administered to targets. Similarly, self-
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humanizing and others dehumanizing (average student at participant’s university) was associated
with more aggression (Locke, 2009). When applied to the religious context, dehumanization of
atheists should predict increase aggression by religious members toward atheists.
Chapter 11: Conclusion
Religion is two-faced. One preaches love and tolerance, the other exhorts hate and
revenge. It is my hope that introducing the theory of dehumanization into this dark side of
religion research not only adds to the current religion literature but could pave a new road for the
study of religious dehumanization alongside religious prejudice.
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Appendix I
Positive UH: Broadminded, Conscientious, Humble, Polite, Thorough.
Negative UH: Disorganized, Hard-hearted, Ignorant, Rude, Stingy
Positive HN: Active, Curious, Friendly, Helpful, Fun-Loving
Negative HN: Impatient, Impulsive, Jealous, Nervous, Shy

Appendix II
1. “Some people deserve to be treated like animals
2. “It is okay to treat badly somebody who behaved like a ‘worm
3. “Someone who is obnoxious does not deserve to be treated like a human being”
4. “Some people have to be treated roughly because they lack feelings that can be hurt”

Appendix III
1.

This person has complex feeling (E)

2.

This person can experience pain (E)

3.

This person is capable of emotion (E)

4.

This person can experience pleasure (E)

5.

This person is capable of doing things on purpose (I)

6.

This person is capable of planned actions (I)

7.

This person has goals (I)

8.

This person is highly conscious (C)

9.

This person has a good memory (C)

10. This person can engage in a great deal of thought (C)
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